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I examine Carrier’s and Ladyman’s structural realist (‘SR’) explanation of the predictive success of phlogiston chemistry.  On their account, it succeeds because phlogiston chemists grasped that there is some common unobservable structure of relations underlying combustion, calcification, and respiration.  I argue that this SR account depends on assuming the truth of current chemical theory of oxidation and reduction, which provides a better explanation of the success of phlogiston theory than SR provides.  I defend an alternative version of inference-to-the-best-explanation scientific realism which I call ‘Best Current Theory Realism’ (BCTR) and argue that it can answer the pessimistic meta-induction. 






Scientific realists are committed to the view that some scientific theories—those which exhibit an appropriate degree of empirical success—make claims about unobservable phenomena that are approximately true.  Many hold that inference-to-the-best-explanation can confirm the realist view, in conjunction with the claim that the best explanation of the success of scientific theories is the realist view that they, or some components of them, are true.  The central difficulty with the explanationist argument is the existence of many scientific theories which were successful in their time but are now rejected as false in light if the emergence of better theories (Laudan, 1981, 1984). Theory change seems to provide counter-evidence to the realist claim that the truth of successful theories is what best explains their success.
Realists have responded by tightening the criteria of successful theories (e.g. requiring ‘novel’ predictions), restricting the claim of truth to components of theories essential to their success and defending a continuity of reference across change in the ontological posits of theories (Psillos, 1999). But the problems inherent in these realist strategies motivate structural realism (SR) —which limits the realist commitment to the truth of mathematical equations and relations preserved across theory-change, independently of ‘theory’ claims concerning the unobservable entities and mechanisms referred to in such equations.
My aim is to evaluate the ability of SR to explain the success of theories.  I argue that the plausibility of SR depends on assuming the truth of our best current theories and their substantive claims concerning unobservable entities and processes. I argue that the plausibility of SR’s explanation of the success of superseded theories depends on an antithetical view I call ‘Best Current Theory Realism’ (or BCTR).  BCTR limits the realists’ commitment to the truth of our best current theories, and thus rejects the continuity-of-true-components hypothesis central to SR, and standard versions of realism.  I defend BCTR as offering the best explanation of both (1) the success of superseded and ‘falsified’ theories and (2) the success of our best current theories.  
I evaluate SR’s ability to explain success through an examination of Ladyman’s and Carrier’s SR account(s) of the success of phlogiston chemistry.  But we set the stage by starting with Worrall’s well-known SR account of Fresnel’s theory of light and some criticisms of it advanced by Psillos.  My aim is to clarify what SR needs to explain in order to ‘explain success’.

(2) Fresnel and the Motivation for SR

 Fresnel’s account of the propagation of light in an ethereal medium was successful in predicting and explaining a wide range of observed features of the diffusion of light (Worrall, 1989, 1989c, 1990, 1994).  It made novel predictions such as the observation of an antecedently unlikely white spot in the center of the shadow of an illuminated circular screen.  The theory qualifies as a genuine empirical success, on stringent realist criteria.  Yet its claims concerning the nature of light are false.  Its explanations and predictions rest on the false claims that a luminiferous ether of molecules is the medium that carries light waves; that the amplitude of light waves correlates with the velocity of the displacements of ether molecules; that the transverse vibrations of light rays is proportional to the oscillations of ether molecules.  All of these hypotheses are abandoned by Maxwell’s theory of the electromagnetic field.  This situation motivates the realist’s desire to find another account of Fresnel’s success, one that identifies true components of the theory that do not involve its ontological claims about unobservable entities and processes.  The realist’s continuity hypothesis requires that such true components are preserved by Maxwell’s theory.  For SR, the solution is the mathematical structure of relations captured by the equations of Fresnel’s theory and preserved by Maxwell, whose theory of the electromagnetic field extends Fresnel’s equations to describe electric and magnetic phenomena, in addition to the propagation of light.  So although Fresnel’s substantive theoretical claims about light are rejected by Maxwell’s theory, “there is nonetheless a structural, mathematical continuity between the two theories” (Worrall, 1990a, 21).  Thus the best explanation of the success of Fresnel’s theory, and that of Maxwell’s as well, is that the equations of both are accurate representations of the unobservable structure of relations underlying electromagnetic phenomena. 
SR strips down a theory’s source of success to its ‘uninterpreted’ equations.  Critics wonder whether such stripped-down mathematical equations can explain theories’ empirical success. Some philosophers have simply assumed that a theory’s empirical success includes its explanatory power, not just its predictive success. It is doubtful that SR’s bare-bones equations can explain a theory’s empirical success, because its explanatory power depends on its substantive ontological claims concerning the unobservable entities and processes.  The ability of Fresnel’s theory to explain phenomena involving the diffusion of light depends on the substantive hypothesis that a luminiferous ether of molecules is the carrier of light waves.  Clearly, it would be a considerable epistemic virtue of IBE realism if it could account for theories’ explanatory success.  Nonetheless, SR can hold that IBE realism is well enough confirmed if it can explain theories’ predictive success. 
For these reasons, I will assume that IBE realism, and thus SR, is confirmed if it can provide the best explanation of theories’ predictive success.  So the issue is whether a theory’s bare-bones uninterpreted equations can explain its predictive success.  Psillos has given a provocative argument in the negative (Psillos 1999, 153-159).  Against SR, a theory’s uninterpreted equations alone do not explain its predictive success, because other components of the theory are required by its power to yield any predictions whatsoever.  For example, the predictions provided by Fresnel’s theory of light require substantive theoretical claims about the conservation of energy, the geometric arrangement of light rays where two media meet, the relation of the amplitude of light waves to the velocity of the displacement of ether molecules, etc.  A theory’s predictive success will depend on its substantive hypotheses concerning unobservables, background knowledge, auxiliary assumptions, bridge laws, etc.  If this is so, IBE realism’s attempt to explain theories’ predictive success will also founder on the problem of theory change.  The uninterpreted equations on which SR relies will not suffice to explain theories’ predictive success.
But Psillos’ challenge rests on the assumption that an explanation of a theory’s predictive success must provide an account of its power to make the predictions that succeed.  SR can reject this assumption and insist that it only needs to explain why theories’ predictions succeed—that is, come true. The truth of the equations of a theory, by themselves, may explain why its predictions succeed, which is all SR will need.  For SR, a theory’s predictions succeed because its equations accurately represent the structural relations between unobservable entities, quite apart from the way these entities or their properties are identified and characterized by the theory. A theory is successful because it gets something right concerning the structure of relations in nature causally responsible for the phenomena that the theory predicts.
This is a perfectly intelligible SR-based explanation of theories’ predictive success.  But is it a plausible explanation, or the best explanation?  Skeptics may worry whether equations can be true apart from the entities and processes they describe, or whether relations in themselves have causal powers, independently of the entities and mechanisms that bear these relations.  Skeptics may worry about the whole distinction between descriptions of entities or their properties, on the one hand, and descriptions of their ‘relations’ on the other.  I will circumvent these issues which are murky.  Rather, I will examine the structural realist accounts of phlogiston theory’s success provided by Carrier and Ladyman.  I will argue that the plausibility of their accounts tacitly depends on assuming the truth of current chemical theory and that this claim opens the way onto a better explanation of the success of theories which I call ‘Best Current Theory Realism’, or BCTR.  But why phlogiston theory?  Does it provide a useful or telling ‘test-case’ for SR?

(3) The Phlogiston Theory as a Test-Case for SR

The example of Fresnel’s theory of light and Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory provides a paradigm of SR because mathematical structure is so obviously retained in this case of theory-change and clearly has a central role in their empirical success.  This case raises the issue of whether SR can provide plausible accounts of cases where mathematical equations are not central to theories’ success.  Phlogiston theory is one such case. There are several first-rate treatments of this case (Musgrave 1976, Pyle 2000).  These case-studies provide strong evidence, marshaled by Ladyman and Carrier, that phlogiston theory enjoyed substantial empirical success on stringent realist criteria like ‘novel predictions’ (Carrier 2004, Ladyman 2008).  So, realists should be able to handle it.  No scientific realist holds that the term ‘phlogiston’ genuinely refers to anything, or that the theory’s claims about it are true, despite its substantial empirical success.  Thus is provides an excellent opportunity for SR to show that it can succeed, despite the problem of theory-change, and for a case in which equations do not do the work required by its notion of structure.  SR does not stand or fall on the basis of its account of phlogiston chemistry, given the large number of theories it may handle better than rival versions of realism.  Nonetheless, I argue that the way Carrier and Ladyman explain success in this case may be symptomatic of some general weaknesses in SR itself, and motivate the rival view BCTR.
The empirical successes of phlogiston chemists are persuasively set out by Ladyman and Carrier.  These chemists [e..g Becher, Stahl, Priestly, Scheel, among others] demonstrated the existence of empirical regularities concerning the process of combustion, calcination, and respiration, and the effects of these processes [now known as oxidation and reduction] on the properties and weight of wood, calxes, metals, and other substances.  Furthermore, their hypotheses concerning the attributes and causal powers of phlogiston generated a unifying explanatory and predictive account of these phenomena.  Thus the theory could account for combustion and calcination as the release of phlogiston from the objects into the air, generating the ‘phlogistication’ of the air and the ‘dephlogistication’ of the objects.  Both sorts of observable processes could be understood as the result of the behavior of phlogiston.  Furthermore, the theory provided a unifying account of other salient phenomena.  Why do calxes and metals exhibit different sensible properties?  Because all metals contain phlogiston, which generate their metallic properties, while calxes lack phlogiston.  Why do substances such as wood and coal end up weighing less as the result of combustion?  Because they lose phlogiston.  When objects undergo combustion in a confined space, why does the combustion terminate more rapidly in the presence of animals than it does in the presence of plants?  Because animal respiration fills the surrounding air with phlogiston, inhibiting the release of phlogiston from an object undergoing combustion, and thus the combustion itself.  Plants, on the other hand, absorb phlogiston from the air, generating a more favorable environment for combustion, the release of an object’s phlogiston into the surrounding air.  Phlogiston theorists also made “novel” predictions, employing the theory to both predict and explain ‘new’ phenomena—either unknown or ignored at the point when the theory is elaborated to accommodate its central problems and phenomena.  Scheel used the theory to correctly predict that new acids (e.g. formic acid, lactic acid, etc.) would be discovered down the road [Ladyman 2008].  Priestly accurately predicted that pure metals would result from heating certain calxs in inflammable (‘phlogisticated’) air [Carrier 2004].
On the account given by Ladyman and Carrier, phlogiston chemists owed their predictive success to the fact that they got something importantly right about the structure of chemical reactions—namely that there is a common unobservable structure of relations underlying combustion, calcification, and respiration, making them the same kind of process.  In current chemistry, this structure is identified as the inverse processes of oxidation and reduction.  Thus phlogiston theory succeeded in unifying three different classes of observable phenomena as the result of the same unobservable structure of relations.  As Ladyman puts it, phlogiston theory “captured one great truth retained by Lavoisier in his oxygen theory, namely that combustion, respiration, and calcification are all the same kind of reaction (viz. ‘oxidation’) and that these reactions have an inverse, namely reduction” (Ladyman, 2008).  In Carrier’s terms, SR is committed to a “natural kind realism” because it explains the strong success of theories, such as the phlogiston case, as a result of the fact that they posit some unobservable mechanism(s) which show that apparently different sorts of phenomena are really “equal in kind” (Carrier 2004).
This account of the case contains a powerful insight into the achievements of phlogiston chemistry.  The issue is whether this account supports SR.  To begin with, notice that the evident plausibility of Ladyman’s formulation of the ‘one great truth’ discovered by phlogiston theorists, and preserved by Lavoisier, assumes the truth of current chemistry’s claims concerning oxidation and reduction.  We know combustion, respiration, and calcification are all the same kind of reaction on the basis of post-Lavoisier chemical knowledge of the nature of oxidation and reduction, and of the entities and mechanisms involved in these processes.  But structural realists cannot avail themselves of the substantive ontological claims of any theory, including our best current theories—without abandoning SR in favor of BCTR.
Can we formulate the ‘one great truth’ uncovered by phlogiston theory, responsible for its predictive success, without assuming our current knowledge of oxidation and reduction?  Phlogiston chemists were committed to a relation of unity or sameness between three kinds of observable phenomena.  Perhaps this conviction constitutes the one great truth responsible for the success of the theory and preserved in its successors.  What SR needs, however, is some unobservable and underlying structure of relations which is supposed to explain the predictive success of phlogiston theory.  What is it?  What truths describe it?  The truth ‘that combustion, respiration, and calcification are all the same kind of reaction’ does not describe any underlying structure of relations, so how can it provide an explanation of anything?  The case is different for mathematical theories like that of Fresnel and Maxwell, where SR can appeal to their equations to describe the structural relations and true components that do the work for realism.

(4) Motivating the Move from SR to BCTR

This brings us to the nub of the issue.  SR can hold that the one great truth discovered by phlogiston theory is simply that there is some unobservable structure of relations underlying combustion, respiration, and calcination which make them the same kind of reaction.  The question is whether this true component of the theory provides an adequate explanation of its predictive success.  It seems like a weak explanation, but that poses no problem for SR if it is the only and thus the best realist explanation that is not vulnerable to the problem of theory-change.  My argument is that it does not provide the best realist explanation.  If we avail ourselves of the insights of post-Lavoisier chemical theory, the result is a much better realist explanation of the success of phlogiston chemistry than the ‘stand-alone’ structural account; though admittedly an explanation based on current chemical knowledge cannot be better if it succumbs to the problem of theory-change and the pessimistic meta-induction (which is addressed below).  
Why does current chemical theory provide a better realist explanation?  The SR account explains the predictive success of phlogiston theory as the result of its insight that there is some unobservable structure of relations responsible for all three sets of observable reactions.  But it is current chemical knowledge of oxidation and reduction which provides compelling evidence that there is indeed such an unobservable structure of relations, correctly identifies the structure, and explains how it generates and unifies the phenomena of combustion, respiration, and calcination.  
Scientific realists typically hold that the success of a superseded theory in a field is best explained by components of the theory that are preserved by the more successful current theories in that field.  My claim is that the plausibility of this backward-looking realist strategy tacitly depends on using our best current theories to identify the truthful components of superseded theories.  Furthermore the realist conviction that these truthful components can explain the superseded theory’s success derives from its plausibility from the fact that our best current theories—with their full range of hypotheses concerning unobservable entities and processes—also employ some modified version of these components in achieving the greater empirical success of our current theories.  To illustrate my argument, consider the SR conviction that the predictive success of Fresnel’s theory of light is explained by the accuracy of its equations, the fact that they capture the structure of relations underlying the propagation of light.  The explanation only works with the benefit of hindsight.  The triumph of Maxwell’s theory of the electromagnetic field utilizes these equations to account for the phenomena of light, electricity, and magnetism successfully treated as field dynamics.  We thus rely on the truth of our best current theory to identify what Fresnel got right and to fix its role in generating the phenomena he successfully predicted.  So, my argument is that the truth of Maxwell’s theory provides the best explanation of Fresnel’s success.  It is this explanation which is required to confirm the role of his equations in that success, a role dependent on knowledge of the electromagnetic field.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that our best current theories provide the best explanation of the success of superseded and ‘falsified’ theories.  The result is a form of inference-to-the-best-explanation realism, or BCTR.  BCTR departs in a sharp way from SR, and more standard forms of realism, by rejecting the need to provide an explanation of the empirical success of every theory solely in terms of its truthful components (structural or otherwise).  Realists may identify this move to break the inferential connection between the success of theories and their truth, or true components, as the abandonment of scientific realism itself.  But BCTR does not break the inferential connection between success and truth.  Rather BCTR reinterprets this inferential connection as one which holds between (1) the success of theories in a scientific field and (2) the truth of our best current theories in that field on the ground that (2) provides the best explanation of (1).
But SR has a powerful rejoinder to my argument for BCTR so far.  SR defends its structural account of the success of theories as the best realist explanation of success which does not fall prey to the problem of theory-change and the pessimistic meta-induction to the conclusion that all theories are probably false—at least in their claims concerning unobservable entities and processes.  If BCTR is undermined by the problem of theory-change then it does not provide the best explanation of successful theories, and SR may claim that title.

(5) Is BCTR Undone by the Problem of Theory-Change?

The problem of theory-change is often taken to support a pessimistic meta-induction to the probable falsity of all scientific theories.  But there is a paradox here which lends some support to BCTR.  In itself the problem of theory-change starts with the observation that there are many theories in the history of science which were successful but later discovered to be false.  This observation is taken to support an inductive inference to the conclusion that in all likelihood, our most successful current theories are also false.  The paradox arises from the fact that the premise of the pessimistic induction—the existence of many successful-but-false theories—depends on the assumption that our best current theories are true, which contradicts the conclusion we are supposed to draw from the inductive inference, or that these current theories are most likely false.  Without the assumption that our best current theories are true, there would be no ground for taking successful-but-superseded to be false.  They are falsified by subsequent and current theories, on the assumption that the latter are true!  But this is precisely the realist claim concerning our best current theories defended by BCTR.  Without this realist claim, the only inductive argument that remains is one from the fact that past theories were successful but rejected or superseded, to the likelihood that our most successful current theories will also be rejected.  But mere theory-change does not bear on the truth or falsity of any of these theories or on the claims of scientific realism.  Indeed, even the conclusion of the pessimistic induction that our best current theories are probably false depends on a realist hypothesis that they will be falsified by new more successful theories that we will know to be true.  Ironically, the pessimistic induction turns into an optimistic induction concerning the future emergence of true theories.
Nevertheless, BCTR requires an independent defense of its realist claim that our best current theories are true and it is reasonable to regard them as such.  As a form of inference-to-the-best-explanation realism, BCTR needs to establish that the truth of our best current theories provides the best explanation of the predictive success of science.  In the above critique of SR, I have argued that taking our best current theories to be true yields the best explanation of the success of their superseded or ‘falsified’ predecessors, and in any case, a better explanation than the ‘stand-alone’ structural explanation provided by SR.  So BCTR preserves the realist’s desired inferential connection between success and truth, but reinterprets the connection as one that holds between the success of superseded theories in a field and the truth of the best current theory in that field.  This inferential connection provides some confirmation for BCTR.
The confirmation of BCTR can be strengthened if it can be shown that the truth of the best current theories also provides the best explanation for their success, as well as that of their predecessors.  But at this point, the problem of theory-change raises its ugly head once again to challenge BCTR in the very manner that SR escapes, which may make it superior to BCTR.  The fact that many theories were successful but false (in their claims concerning unobservable entities and processes) seems to undermine the inferential connection between success and truth.  Why should the success of the best current theories be any different, calling into question the inference from their success to their truth, and an appeal to their truth, to explain their success.  The answer given so far in this essay is meant to support the inference from the success of superseded theories in a field to the truth of the best current theories in that field—on the ground that it provides the best explanation of the success of their predecessors.  But can it also be shown that the truth of our best current theories provides the best explanation of their success as well, strengthening the case for BCTR?  Why should it, if superseded theories were successful but false?
The key to an answer is to identify a property of the best current theories lacking in their predecessors and justifying the realist explanation.  Our best current theories enjoy a measure and quality of predictive success unique in the history of the whole scientific field.  They are unique in that they alone realize the highest standards of empirical success and confirmation in the field and thus often raise its standards of accuracy, scope, consilience, completeness, unification, and simplicity.  This is a fact about the best current theories which distinguishes them from their predecessors.  If the question is posed of why the best current theories stand at the apex of empirical success, the hypothesis that it is because they are true provides a plausible— and perhaps the best—explanation.
On this basis, BCTR also has the resources to break the pessimistic meta-induction.  For if (1) our best current theories attain a unique empirical success absent in (2) their predecessors, this difference between (1) and (2) undermines the inference from the falsity of (2) to the likelihood that (1) are also false.  Yet defenders of the pessimistic meta-induction will not be convinced that the best current theories possess the unique property of attaining a distinctive empirical success at the pinnacle of confirmational virtues.  They may argue that this fails to be a unique property because superseded theories also exhibited this property in their time and place.  So the scientific realist would have been committed to the truth of these theories at the time and in the context where they stood at the height of empirical success.
True enough, but this move fails to save the pessimistic meta-induction because it misconstrues the status of scientific realism as an empirical hypothesis bound to explain the body of evidence available to us.  For BCTR, the fact to be explained is that our best current theories succeed in realizing the most demanding standards of success in the whole history of their fields—and their predecessors do not:  This is the evidence which scientific realism wants to explain.  If, as I argue, the best explanation of this fact is (1) that these current theories are true while (2) their predecessors are false, then this inference-to-the-best-explanation trumps the inductive inference from the falsity of (2) to the falsity of (1).  Bringing the argument together, the pessimistic induction is undermined if the truth of our best current theories provides the best explanation of their success, and also that of their falsified predecessors.
But there is yet another challenge to BCTR posed by the problem of theory-change, and induction from the fate of theories in science.  Successful theories are generally superseded by more successful ones, making it highly probable that our best current theories will sooner or later be displaced by others that satisfy yet higher standards of predictive success.  Call this ‘the optimistic meta-induction’.  Does this induction cast doubt on BCTR and its commitment to the truth of our best current theories?  BCTR, as an empirical hypothesis, must rest on available evidence and is fallible in light of new evidence.  If and when our best current theories give way to yet more successful theories, this would not refute BCTR, but it would transform what the realist has to explain, and which theories are taken to be true.  BCTR is committed to the truth of our best theories because that provides the best explanation of the success of science.  Given our present evidence, our best current theories are the best theories and ground a realist commitment to them.  This is all that BCTR requires, and is thus not threatened by the possibility or likelihood that what count as the best theories will alter in time.  If and when more successful theories arise, then the realist commitment to their truth may provide the best explanation of the success of science.  In this way, BCTR saves scientific realism from pessimistic and optimistic inductions concerning the future of science.  For realists, inference-to-the-best-explanation trumps inductive inference in the determination of which scientific theories it is reasonable to regard as true!
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